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A key goal in the study of decision making is determining how neural networks involved
in perception and motor planning interact to generate a given choice, but this is
complicated due to the internal trade-off between speed and accuracy, which confounds
their individual contributions. Urgent decisions, however, are special: they may range
between random and fully informed, depending on the amount of processing time (or
stimulus viewing time) available in each trial, but regardless, movement preparation
always starts early on. As a consequence, under time pressure it is possible to produce
a psychophysical curve that characterizes perceptual performance independently of
reaction time, and this, in turn, makes it possible to pinpoint how perceptual information
(which requires sensory input) modulates motor planning (which does not) to guide
a choice. Here we review experiments in which, on the basis of this approach, the
origin of the speed-accuracy trade-off becomes particularly transparent. Psychophysical,
neurophysiological, and modeling results in the “compelled-saccade” task indicate that,
during urgent decision making, perceptual information—if and whenever it becomes
available—accelerates or decelerates competing motor plans that are already ongoing.
This interaction affects both the reaction time and the probability of success in any given
trial. In two experiments with reward asymmetries, we find that speed and accuracy can
be traded in different amounts and for different reasons, depending on how the particular
task contingencies affect specific neural mechanisms related to perception and motor
planning. Therefore, from the vantage point of urgent decisions, the speed-accuracy
trade-off is not a unique phenomenon tied to a single underlying mechanism, but
rather a typical outcome of many possible combinations of internal adjustments within
sensory-motor neural circuits.
Keywords: choice, computational model, decision making, discrimination, mental chronometry, race to threshold,
saccade, subtraction method
1. THE PROBLEM OF PARSING THE REACTION TIME
In daily life, some decisions are rather abstract (should I trust the
financial adviser?) whereas others require a specific action (should
I press the brake or the accelerator?). Within the latter category,
speed and accuracy are inversely related in virtually every task
(Woodworth, 1899; Hick, 1952; Wickelgren, 1977; Chittka et al.,
2009); the faster the decision, the less accurate the outcome. This
means that the traditional, key quantities that are used to measure
cognitive performance, the reaction time (RT) and the percentage
of correct responses, are fundamentally intertwined. What is the
underlying cause of this interdependence? How does it emerge
from the structure and dynamics of neural circuits? We consider
these questions in the context of decisions that are coupled to
immediate actions.
Intuitive models of the speed-accuracy trade-off have been
formulated (Reddi and Carpenter, 2000; Bogacz et al., 2010;
Standage et al., 2013), but the empirical investigation of these
questions reveals further complexity (Cook and Maunsell, 2002;
DiCarlo and Maunsell, 2005; Battaglia and Schrater, 2007; Cohen
et al., 2009; Heitz and Schall, 2012). Part of the problem is that the
RT reflects the total amount of time consumed by all the subsys-
tems that contribute to a choice or decision process. Thus, when
a subject executes an action in response to a sensory scene, the
RT must comprise, at the very least, the time necessary for ana-
lyzing the sensory information plus the amount of time required
to plan the motor action that is congruent with that informa-
tion. Discerning just these two components has been challenging
because the underlying neural networks are themselves strongly
interrelated: neurons that encode a subject’s perceptual decision,
that participate in motor planning, or that do both, are typi-
cally found within the same, local microcircuits (Horwitz and
Newsome, 1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Hernández et al.,
2010; Costello et al., 2013; Mante et al., 2013). Furthermore,
other distinct cognitive processes may contribute to the RT too;
for instance, deploying visuospatial attention or accessing infor-
mation stored in memory could represent separate processing
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steps requiring a certain amount of time to unfold independently
of the perceptual and motor-planning stages (Sternberg, 1966;
Monsell, 2003; Horowitz et al., 2004; Busse et al., 2008). As such,
the RT must reflect a total sum over the times consumed by
multiple covert processes (Sternberg, 1969), each of which could
conceivably constrain or be traded against the others.
Broadly speaking, three techniques have been used to distin-
guish the two major components of the RT during relatively fast
perceptual decision-making tasks, i.e., the contributions of per-
ceptual and motor-planning processes. (1) A common approach
is to introduce a delay between the perceptual evaluation and
the motor report required in each trial. This strategy is widely
used to characterize neuronal activity as sensory-, memory-,
or movement-related neurons (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001;
Sommer and Wurtz, 2001; Lemus et al., 2007). (2) Another pos-
sibility is to limit the amount of cue viewing time (Bergen and
Julesz, 1983; Ratcliff and Rouder, 2000; Bodelón et al., 2007; Kiani
et al., 2008). The idea is that neurons, or any processing compo-
nent in general, whose responses vary systematically as functions
of cue viewing time may be strongly involved in the analysis
of perceptual information. This manipulation is not as straight-
forward as it may seem, though, because controlling very short
stimulus durations is difficult and typically requires additional
masking stimuli to prevent stimulus persistence, and such mask-
ing introduces other potential problems (Breitmeyer and Ogmen,
2000, 2006). (3) An alternative that is not quite as intuitive, is
to do the reverse of 1: inform choices on the basis of urgent
perceptual decisions. That is, start preparing a motor response
first, before the relevant cue information becomes available (Ghez
et al., 1989; Chapman et al., 2010). That way, the initial motor
planning stage stays relatively constant.
That is the approach we have taken (Stanford et al., 2010;
Shankar et al., 2011; Costello et al., 2013). It provides a sim-
ple and highly effective way to dissociate motor and perceptual
performance, and thus a different set of tools with which to char-
acterize and quantify perceptual decision-making mechanisms.
Here we review previously published results of experiments in
which urgent decisions inform rapid choices (Stanford et al.,
2010; Shankar et al., 2011; Costello et al., 2013), but focus specif-
ically on their implications for understanding the origin of the
speed-accuracy trade-off. As discussed below, under this light it is
possible to see not only how perceptual capacity and motor exe-
cution interact to determine the response speed and success rate
of a subject, but also how additional factors such as motivation
or internal preference may alter that interaction. In this way, it
becomes quite clear that the speed-accuracy trade-off is not a uni-
tary phenomenon derived from a unique, underlyingmechanism,
but is instead the result of multiple, semi-independent moving
parts that interact with each other within sensory-motor neural
circuits.
2. PERCEPTUAL DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE
As a means to disambiguate perceptual and motor processes,
we designed a compelled-response task wherein participants are
given the instruction to respond before the relevant perceptual
information appears (Stanford et al., 2010). In the oculomotor
version, the compelled-saccade task (Figure 1A), the response is
FIGURE 1 | Dissociating perceptual and motor performance in the
compelled-saccade task. (A) Sequence of events in the task. The subject is
required to make a saccade when the fixation point disappears (go). If the
chosen targetmatches the color of the fixation point (red, in this example), the
choice is correct and a reward is obtained. The go instruction is given first,
before the relevant sensory information is revealed (cue). The gap
(50—250ms) is the time interval between the go and the cue. The rPT is the
amount of time during which the color information can potentially inform the
saccadic choice. (B) Percentage of correct responses as a function of gap, or
psychometric curve. (C)Mean RT (±1 SD) as a function of gap, or
chronometric curve. Both correct and incorrect trials are included. (D)
Percentage of correct responses as a function of rPT (equal to RT − gap), or
tachometric curve. In (B–D), blue and black lines/symbols correspond to
psychophysical and simulation results, respectively. See Shankar et al. (2011)
for details about the experimental data and modeling methods.
an eye movement. First, the observer fixates on a central spot,
the color of which indicates the color of the eventual target. Then
two yellow (neutral) dots appear in the periphery; these are sim-
ply placeholders indicating the possible response locations. Next,
the central fixation point disappears, and this is the “go” signal
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that tells the observer “respond now!” Note that, when the go is
given, the identities of the target and distracter are still unknown,
but the observer must begin planning a movement to one of the
two potential targets nonetheless. Then, after a variable time gap
(from 50 to 250 ms) the peripheral dots change color, reveal-
ing one to be the target and the other the distracter. The onset
of the subject’s response occurs when the eyes just start moving,
and marks the end of the RT period that started at the go signal
(Figure 1A).
The logic behind this design is that, by telling the subject when
to respond, the motor choice process is initiated early, and so per-
ceptual information, once presented, influences a motor plan that
is already developing. By unpredictably varying the time delay
between the go signal and the appearance of the color cue (i.e.,
the gap), the subject generates responses that range between fully
informed choices (for gaps that are much shorter than the typical
saccadic RT) and fully uninformed choices, or guesses (for gaps
that are comparable to the typical saccadic RT), all with the same
underlying distribution of motor plans. So, it becomes possible
to dissociate the effect of motor preparation from the perceptual
decision-making process in an otherwise standard saccadic choice
task.
The crucial event in the task is the go instruction, which com-
pels the subject to respond before the target and distracter are
revealed. But, why is it that subjects do not simply wait for the
color cue to appear before making a choice? In essence, there are
three reasons. First, because responding is natural; with the fixa-
tion point gone and two salient objects present, it takes effort not
to look at one of them. Second, because throughout training, the
subjects learn two separate rules, (1) that the offset of the fixation
point means “respond now!” and (2) that the correct choice is the
onematching the color of the fixation point. Rule 1 is learned first,
and if necessary, which is not always the case, it is practiced inde-
pendently of rule 2. And third, during the compelled-saccade task
subjects have a limited time window for making a valid response,
so a trial is scored as incorrect—and no reward is given—if the
RT is too long, regardless of the choice. It should be noted, how-
ever, that consistent with the first two points, such trials in which
the RT limit is exceeded are extremely rare (<2%). For a detailed
analysis of possible waiting strategies see Salinas et al. (2010).
Performance in the task is expected to decline toward chance
as a function of the gap, and indeed this is what happens, as illus-
trated with representative data from two monkeys (Figure 1B).
In contrast, RTs are expected to remain approximately—but not
exactly—constant, and this is also the case: mean RTs change by
less than 30ms, or approximately 10%, while performance varies
between chance and near 100% correct (Figure 1C). In other
perceptual decision-making tasks, RTs often show comparable
variations of a few tens of milliseconds, although the difference
over the full performance range sometimes reaches hundreds of
milliseconds, or several fold (Wolfe, 1998; Ratcliff and Smith,
2004; Palmer et al., 2005; Reinagel, 2013a,b). The variation of
∼30ms in mean RT seen in the compelled-saccade task is mod-
est, but more importantly, it and the systematic increase in the
spread of the RTs with gap (error bars in Figure 1C) can be fully
accounted for by a simple model; the key notion is that even
though the initial motor planning process is statistically the same
for all the gaps, the motor conflict is resolved sooner or later
depending on when the perceptual information arrives (more on
this below).
2.1. THE TACHOMETRIC CURVE
Although the gap is the main control parameter in the task, the
variable that fundamentally determines the probability of success
in each trial is the raw processing time, or rPT (Figure 1A), which
is the amount of time before the onset of the motor response dur-
ing which the color information is available to inform the choice.
It is important to stress that this theoretical limit to the maximum
amount of cue viewing time is a trial-specific quantity, which can
be easily computed via
rPT = RT − gap (1)
based on the gap and the RT recorded in each trial. Using this
equation we can determine how long the perceptual information
was available for guiding each saccadic choice. Furthermore, by
plotting the percentage of correct responses versus rPT we obtain
a “tachometric curve,” a curve that characterizes the perceptual
performance of a subject (Figure 1D).
This curve has a sigmoidal shape with parameters that are
readily interpretable in terms of psychophysical capacity. For the
data in Figure 1D, the saturation values are very near 100% cor-
rect, so the color information is fully exploited by the subjects
when they have enough time to view the cue. The center point
of the curve is the rPT at which the percent correct is halfway
between chance and the saturation value. It is an indication of
how much viewing time is necessary for perceptual information
to have a significant impact on performance. For the curves in
Figure 1D, the center points are 134 ± 2ms for monkey S and
157 ± 2ms for monkey G. Trials to the left of the center point
are mostly near chance performance and correspond predomi-
nantly to uninformed choices, or guesses, whereas trials to the
right of the center point correspond mostly to fully informed
choices. Finally, the steepness of the curve near the center point
provides a measure of the speed with which perceptual infor-
mation influences the choice once this information has begun
having an impact. For monkeys S and G, half of the performance
range (from 62.5% to 87.5% correct) is covered within 24 ± 2ms
and 40 ± 2ms, respectively, so the color discrimination unfolds
extremely rapidly once it gets going.
2.2. MULTIPLE MECHANISMS FOR GENERATING TRADE-OFFS
In principle, simultaneous variations in RT and percent correct
may result from changes in motor planning alone, in percep-
tion alone, or in both, and to distinguish these options it is
essential to have independent, quantifiable measures of their
impact on choice behavior. That is the key advantage of the
compelled-response approach, it provides independent assess-
ments of perceptual and motor performance in the tachometric
and chronometric (RT versus gap) curves, respectively. This is
illustrated in detail further below with data from two experi-
ments, but before discussing those, it is useful, first, to consider
some simplified examples, and second, to gain some mechanis-
tic intuition, via a heuristic model, about the ways in which
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perceptual and motor-planning processes interact when deci-
sions are made under time pressure. The three scenarios that
follow are meant simply to illustrate, based on the model, how
variations in the three psychophysical curves obtained in the
compelled-saccade task (Figures 1B–D) may relate to each other.
The speed-accuracy trade-off is often explained in terms of a
change in threshold (Reddi and Carpenter, 2000; Bogacz et al.,
2010; Hanks et al., 2011). That is, a motor response is triggered
after a “decision variable” reaches a particular value (Figure 2A),
and increasing that value produces both higher RTs and a higher
proportion of correct responses. This is because it takes longer
for the variable to go from baseline to threshold in each trial,
and a longer RT means more time during which the percep-
tual information can advance the decision variable in the correct
direction. Although our theoretical framework is somewhat dif-
ferent (and considers the threshold to be fixed; see below), in the
compelled-saccade task a change in threshold would have pre-
cisely the expected effects associated with a standard trade-off
(Figures 2B,C), but notably, it would have absolutely no impact
on the tachometric curve (Figure 2D). This is because, in contrast
to the psychometric and chronometric curves, the tachometric
curve is highly insensitive to the dynamics of the motor plan-
ning process. In essence, it reflects how soon (after the cue is
revealed) and how strongly the perceptual informationmodulates
motor activity that is already rising. In the context of this urgent
decision-making task, both the rising activity—which specifi-
cally represents a motor plan—and the threshold are properties
intrinsic to the motor circuitry, in agreement with neurophysio-
logical evidence (Costello et al., 2013 see also Hanes and Schall,
1996; Heitz and Schall, 2012). So, variations in threshold could
produce a standard trade-off between speed and accuracy in
the compelled-saccade task, but this mechanism would leave the
tachometric curve intact.
The response threshold is not the only quantity that may
be altered to produce a trade-off. In theory, varying the base-
line level of activity would be essentially equivalent (see Bogacz
FIGURE 2 | Changes in speed and accuracy generated by three distinct
mechanisms. All results are expectations based on model simulations of the
compelled-saccade task. (A) Schematic of a developing oculomotor plan.
A saccade is triggered shortly after motor-related activity (blue trace) reaches a
threshold (dotted lines). The threshold-crossing time, and thus the RT, varies
with the threshold value. (B–D)Model results. Variations in threshold produce a
standard speed-accuracy trade-off. As the threshold increases, both
performance (B) andmean RT (C) increase, but the tachometric curve (D) does
not change. (E) Schematic illustrating how threshold-crossing time varies with
the build-up rate of the motor plan. (F–H)Model results. Variations in mean
build-up rate also produce a trade-off. As the mean build-up rate decreases,
both performance (F) and mean RT (G) increase, whereas the tachometric
curve (H) changes minimally. (I) Schematic illustrating how threshold-crossing
time varies with the latency of the go signal. (J–L)Model results. Variations in
visual latency alone do not produce a trade-off. When the latency of the visual
stimuli (go signal and color cue) decreases, performance does not change (E),
but mean RT (F) decreases and the tachometric curve (G) shifts to the left,
indicating that perception informs the subject’s choices systematically sooner.
Results are frommodel simulations either with identical parameters as in
Figure 1 (for monkey S), or with a 25% increase or a 25% decrease in the value
of one parameter, either the threshold (B–D), the mean build-up rate of the
motor plans (F–H), or the latency of the visual information (J–L).
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et al., 2010). But beyond that, in the context of urgent-decision
tasks in which motor planning starts before perceptual analy-
sis, changes in the mean build-up rate of the developing motor
activity (Figure 2E) would produce qualitatively similar effects
(Figures 2F–H). The intuition is simple: when motor plans rise
more quickly, the excursion from baseline to threshold takes less
time and there is, consequently, less opportunity for the per-
ceptual information to influence those ongoing motor plans.
This case would again correspond to behavioral changes driven
exclusively bymodulations in the dynamics of themotor circuitry.
Finally, consider another hypothetical scenario in which the
only difference between three conditions is in the latency with
which the visual stimuli, i.e., the go signal (Figure 2I) and the cue,
may start informing the motor plans. This latency could depend
on multiple factors, such as contrast or alertness, for instance,
but regardless of the cause, everything else being equal, a decrease
in visual latency would manifest in a very specific way: it would
decrease the mean RTs (Figure 2K), because effectively all afferent
delays would be shorter; it would produce a leftward shift of the
tachometric curve (Figure 2L), indicating that perception starts
guiding performance sooner relative to cue onset; and it would
have no effect on the observed percentage of correct responses
(Figure 2J), because the motor plans would still have the same
amount of time to rise before the arrival of the cue information
(stated differently, from the point of view of the motor plan-
ning circuit, the time elapsed between the arrival of the go signal
and the arrival of the color cue would not change). So, in this
case the RT would drop without a trade-off, and the underlying
mechanism would be purely sensory/perceptual.
Now, if the mechanisms illustrated in Figure 2 could be com-
bined arbitrarily, it would be possible to produce a range of
trade-offs with widely different magnitudes in terms of the ratio
of change in percent correct to change in RT. Also keep in mind
that, for simplicity, these effects were illustrated based on just
three parameters, saccade threshold, mean build-up rate, and
visual latency, but various other parameters of the motor and per-
ceptual circuits could serve to modulate performance. So, more
generally, different combinations of alterations in the intrinsic
dynamics of the motor plans and in the perceptual discrimina-
tion process could lead to large or small changes in RT coupled to
large or small changes in accuracy.
In conclusion, while overall it may still be true that increases in
performance are accompanied by increases in RT, and vice versa, a
trade-off may occur for very different reasons, and its magnitude
may vary enormously. As will be shown below, this is pre-
cisely what appears to be happening under realistic experimental
conditions.
3. A HEURISTIC MODELING FRAMEWORK FOR DESCRIBING
URGENT DECISIONS
This section presents a model that replicates the performance of
subjects in the compelled-saccade task and is consistent with the
neurophysiology of the underlying neural circuits. Although the
model and associated theoretical framework have been described
before (for details and parameter values see Salinas et al., 2010;
Shankar et al., 2011), they are important for interpreting the
experimental data relevant to the speed-accuracy trade-off that
are discussed below. We review key findings that establish the
model’s credibility.
The preparation for action in the context of the compelled-
saccade task can be viewed as a competition between two oppos-
ing motor plans that develop concurrently, racing to a threshold
for triggering a movement to one of the two potential target loca-
tions. The direction in which the eyes move is determined by
whichever plan reaches the threshold first, but crucially, when
perceptual information is available, it modulates the ongoing
plans to favor the correct choice. That is the essence of the “accel-
erated race-to-threshold” model (Salinas et al., 2010; Stanford
et al., 2010; Shankar et al., 2011). Such a model is useful because it
provides a quantitative, yet intuitive, link between the measured
psychophysical behavior and its neural basis.
The dynamics of the model are determined by two key
assumptions. (1) That the cue information accelerates the motor
plan developing toward the target and decelerates the plan devel-
oping toward the distracter. And (2), that in each trial, the
competing motor plans begin rising toward threshold shortly
after the go signal, with initial build-up rates drawn randomly
from a distribution. In this way, the outcome of any given trial
depends on when the cue information becomes available relative
to how advanced each of the developing oculomotor plans is at
that time, and notably, this interaction can take just five distinct
forms (Figures 3A–E).
In these examples (Figures 3A–E), a correct choice is produced
when the cyan motor plan wins the race. In all trials, the initial
build-up rates randomly favor one of the two potential targets,
and reflect the subject’s initial predisposition. So, when a saccade
is triggered before the cue information arrives (Figures 3D,E), the
result is an uninformed choice, i.e., a guess. Note that the prob-
ability of such a random outcome increases both for longer gap
durations and for higher initial build-up rates. In contrast, when
the cue information arrives early enough to guide the ongoing
motor plans, the result is an informed choice (Figures 3A–C).
However, the initial build-up rates still play an important role:
when the motor plan that is congruent with the target starts as
the leader, it curves upward slightly and triggers a correct sac-
cade with a short RT (Figure 3A), but when this target-related
plan lags behind, it starts out slowly and has more ground to
cover once the acceleration kicks in, so it takes longer to reach
threshold (Figure 3B). On such trials success also requires that the
distracter-related plan be decelerated, but if this leading plan is
sufficiently advanced, the influence of the cue informationmay be
insufficient to prevent it from reaching threshold and producing
an incorrect saccade (Figure 3C).
Thus, the mechanistic signature of the model is this: when the
motor activity evoked shortly after the go signal is intense and
strongly committed to one of the potential targets, the result is
typically an uninformed choice (with a short or negative rPT),
whereas when the initial motor activity is more moderate and less
biased, the later arriving perceptual information is more likely to
resolve the motor conflict in favor of the correct choice (with a
long rPT). We think that similar dynamics are, in general, the
underlying substrate of rapid perceptual decisions lasting just a
fraction of the RT (see Discussion; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).
The accelerated race-to-threshold model, which instantiates these
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FIGURE 3 | The accelerated race-to-threshold model closely
reproduces psychophysical data in the compelled-saccade task.
(A–E) Simulated trials illustrating the five essential types of interaction
between competing motor plans. In each panel, two competing variables
represent oculomotor activity that triggers an eye movement either to
the right (cyan) or to the left (magenta). In these examples the target
is on the right, so races in which the cyan trace reaches threshold first
correspond to correct choices. The two variables start racing 75ms
(afferent delay) after the go signal and a saccade is triggered 15ms
(efferent delay) after threshold is crossed. Initial build-up rates are
drawn randomly in each trial. Gray shades indicate the time during
which the cue information is available to modulate the motor activity.
During informed choices (A–C, gap = 100ms), the motor plan toward
the target accelerates (its build-up rate increases) and the plan toward
the distracter decelerates (its build-up rate decreases), whereas during
guesses (D,E, gap = 250ms) the build-up rates do not change. (F)
Reaction time distributions in correct (cyan) and incorrect (magenta) trials
at specific gaps (indicated on upper left corners). Results are shown for
two monkeys, S (left) and G (right). In each plot, the black curves
correspond to model simulations. Vertical lines indicate the center point
of the tachometric curve of the corresponding monkey. Results are
based on the same experimental and simulated data as in Figure 1.
interactions quantitatively, is consistent with both psychophysical
and neurophysiological data, as discussed next.
3.1. ACCOUNTING FOR THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF BEHAVIOR
With the correct parameter values, themodel can replicate amon-
key’s psychometric, chronometric and tachometric curves very
accurately (Figures 1B–D, compare Data versus Model), but each
point in these curves aggregates many trials with motor competi-
tions (races) of different types (Figures 3A–E), so the three curves
provide a relatively coarse summary of the subject’s behavior.
Matching the full RT distributions for correct and error trials at
each individual gap (Figure 3F) is a much more stringent bench-
mark for any model (Salinas et al., 2010), because the shapes
of these distributions are directly related to the more limited
mixtures of race trajectories that occur at each gap.
For example, the distribution of RTs for correct responses, or
hits (Figure 3F, cyan histograms), clearly transitions from uni-
modal to bimodal. According to the accelerated race-to-threshold
model, this is because short gaps contain a large proportion
of fast informed decisions (Figure 3A), whereas long gaps con-
tain a mixture of correct guesses (Figure 3E) and slow informed
decisions (Figure 3B). Similarly, the distribution of RTs for
incorrect responses (Figure 3F, magenta histograms) contains
mostly wrong guesses (Figure 3D) and a small proportion of
informed choices that were nonetheless incorrect (Figure 3C),
which occupy the rightward tail of the histograms.
These combinations are easy to distinguish by noticing that the
rPT that corresponds to the center point of the tachometric curve
can be marked as a line in each plot (vertical lines in Figure 3F),
and that this line divides each RT distribution into two parts: the
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trials to the right are all informed choices, whereas the trials to the
left are, except for those very near the line, uninformed choices.
With this in mind, it becomes immediately obvious that correct
trials at short gaps are almost always informed (cyan histograms
in Figure 3F, top; RTs are predominantly to the right of the line),
whereas correct trials at long gaps are almost always lucky guesses
(cyan histograms in Figure 3F, bottom; RTs are predominantly to
the left of the line). This also explains why, when looking at the
correct responses going from long to short gaps, the peak to the
right of the line moves progressively to the left: as the perceptual
information arrives earlier and earlier, more and more trials that
would have otherwise ended up on the rightward tail of the distri-
bution are accelerated, resulting instead in short RTs. The position
of the line itself shifts to the left as the gap decreases because
rPT and RT differ precisely by the gap value (Equation 1), but
the center point of the tachometric curve remains a fixed num-
ber for each monkey—a number that, as mentioned earlier and
illustrated in Figure 3, is crucial for assessing the degree to which
perceptual information determines the outcome of each trial.
3.2. MODEL PARAMETERS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
As implemented here, the accelerated race-to-threshold model
has 11 parameters that can be adjusted to fit the psychophysical
data of individual monkeys, as in Figure 3F (Salinas et al., 2010;
Shankar et al., 2011; Costello et al., 2013). Although this number
may seem large, the effect of any given parameter is quite limited;
each one affects the dynamics of the two competing motor plans
in a very specific way and has a well-defined neurophysiological
interpretation.
Three parameters describe the distribution from which the
initial build-up rates of the two motor plans are drawn in each
trial. A description based on three numbers, corresponding to
the mean, variance, and correlation of the build-up rates, is quite
minimal for a two-dimensional (joint) distribution.
Two parameters, one for the mean and another for the vari-
ance, determine the visual latency in each trial. This latency is
agnostic about the underlying causes (afferent delay, additional
visual processing stages, etc.); it simply describes when the rele-
vant visual information (go and cue) reaches the model circuit.
For the results presented here, we assume that the mean latencies
of the go signal and the color cue are the same, but this is not
necessarily the case in general.
Three parameters describe how perception alters the trajecto-
ries of the ongoing motor plans (as in Figures 3A,B); they specify
the magnitude of the acceleration and deceleration and how long
they last. Using fixed acceleration and deceleration coefficients
is the simplest possible way to describe motor plans that are
not perfectly straight, i.e., for which the build-up rates are not
constant.
One other parameter, the probability of confusion or lapse
rate, accounts for incorrect responses that occur at long process-
ing times and cannot be attributed to insufficient cue viewing
time. There are many possible reasons for such lapses; here they
are simply considered random events.
Finally, two additional parameters are included to replicate
a subtle but systematic feature seen in distributions of RTs
that are bimodal (as in Figure 3F, for 175–225ms gap), a dip
that is slightly more pronounced than expected. This corre-
sponds closely to a phenomenon known as “saccadic inhibition”
that occurs when a distracting stimulus appears while a sac-
cade is already being programmed (Reingold and Stampe, 2002;
Buonocore and McIntosh, 2008, 2012; Bompas and Sumner,
2011). The race model accounts for this deviation via a brief inter-
ruption in the rise of the motor activity linked to the detection of
the cue. The two corresponding parameters determine the onset
and offset of the brief pause, and have a relatively minor impact
on other aspects of the data.
Thus, the model starts with a simple description of the motor
choice process and is augmented with a mechanism whereby
perception can guide it. So, is the model activity comparable
to saccade-related neural responses evoked during perceptually
driven choices?
3.3. LINKING BEHAVIOR AND NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
The accelerated race-to-threshold model provides excellent fits
to the RT distributions at fixed gaps for all the monkeys we
have trained in the compelled-saccade task (Shankar et al., 2011).
Although this is certainly reassuring, psychophysical data alone
cannot fully constrain or validate such a mechanistic model, even
if the fits were perfect; this is true not only for our model (Salinas
et al., 2010) but also in general (e.g., Ratcliff and Smith, 2004;
Brunton et al., 2013; Miller and Katz, 2013). However, the activity
of single neurons recorded in the frontal eye field (FEF) of behav-
ing monkeys is consistent with key, non-trivial predictions of the
model (Salinas et al., 2010; Stanford et al., 2010; Costello et al.,
2013), suggesting that, indeed, its basic layout is correct.
To generate specific predictions directly comparable to neu-
rophysiological data, the model was run with parameter values
that fitted the behavioral data of monkey S, and expected neural
responses (Figures 4B,C) were computed by averaging separately
the simulated motor plans obtained in short- and long-rPT tri-
als. The short- and long-rPT intervals were defined according to
the tachometric curve so that they would include chiefly guesses
and informed choices, respectively (Figure 4A, shaded areas). In
this way we could ask: how should the mean neural responses dif-
fer between correct, uninformed guesses and correct, informed
discriminations?
The answer to this question comprises essentially two predic-
tions about the relative amounts of activity for saccades in the
preferred (red) versus the antipreferred (green) direction of ocu-
lomotor neurons. First, during uninformed choices (short rPTs),
the motor plan into the movement field should demonstrate a
strong advantage shortly after the go signal (Figure 4B; arrows
on left column). This preference should be evident before the
cue is even presented (Figure 4B; middle column), and corre-
sponds to a heavily biased motor competition that is decided
well in advance of saccade onset (Figure 4B; right column).
Second, during informed choices (long rPTs), the two motor
plans should start building up more slowly and without a strong
bias (Figure 4C; arrow on left column). In fact, in this case the
expectation is somewhat counterintuitive: during the prolonged
period of motor ambivalence, the motor plan in the direction of
the target should, on average, lag behind the plan favoring the dis-
tracter (red traces below green), but ultimately the conflict must
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FIGURE 4 | Comparison between model and FEF neuronal responses.
The accelerated race-to-threshold model was simulated with parameters that
fitted the behavioral data of Money S, as in Figure 3, and the simulated
activity averaged across trials was compared to that recorded from
motor-related neurons in FEF. (A) Simulated tachometric curve. Gray shades
indicate ranges used to sort the simulated trials into short- (left shade,
guesses) and long-rPT (right shade, informed choices) groups. (B,C) Average
model responses for short- (B) and long-rPT (C) trials aligned either on the go
signal (left column), the cue (middle column), or saccade onset (right column).
All data are from correct responses. Separate averages were calculated for
choices in the preferred (red traces) and antipreferred (green traces) direction
of the model neurons. (D–F) As in A–C, but for 45 FEF neurons (motor and
visuomotor) that differentiated significantly between movements into and
away from the movement field before the saccade. Shaded areas indicate ±1
SE across neurons. In all plots, the y axis corresponds to normalized firing
rate. Blue arrows mark key differences in evoked activity during guesses
versus informed choices. See Costello et al. (2013) for details about the
experimental data and modeling methods.
be resolved in favor of the correct choice. The reason for this
effect is that, as discussed earlier, correct choices with long rPTs
often correspond to trials in which the target-related motor plan
is initially weak (Figure 3B), so a similar pattern emerges when
averaging over multiple trials (Figure 4C).
Themean evoked responses of FEF neurons (motor and visuo-
motor) with significant movement-related activity were generally
in excellent agreement with the expectations based on the model
(Stanford et al., 2010; Costello et al., 2013). In particular, during
informed choices, there was, indeed, a prolonged period of motor
conflict during which the plan in favor of the distracter showed
a slight initial advantage (Figure 4F), whereas no ambiguity was
seen during correct guesses (Figure 4E). Observed differences
between correct and incorrect responses were also in agreement
with the model (Costello et al., 2013). Finally, to compare the
model and recorded responses quantitatively, mean traces were
calculated and analyzed as continuous functions of rPT via a
sliding window, and the ensuing results led to two additional con-
clusions: (1) that the motor plans favoring the target and the
distracter do accelerate and decelerate, respectively, and (2) that
the acceleration and deceleration vary as functions of cue viewing
time (rPT) as expected given the center point of the tachometric
curve (Stanford et al., 2010; Costello et al., 2013).
These results are extremely important because they
support the two fundamental elements of the accelerated
race-to-threshold model. First, that in the compelled-saccade
task, ongoing motor plans are modulated by perceptual
information if and when that information becomes available
to the motor circuitry, but a motor choice is made either with
(informed) or without it (uninformed). And second, that in spite
of a profound impact on behavioral performance, the effect of
perception on neural activity is rather subtle, particularly for
eye movements into the receptive field of the neurons, because
acceleration manifests as a slight difference in the curvature
of the motor plan as it rises to threshold (Figures 4E,F, right
column; compare red traces). Note that it did not have to be
this way, as the psychophysical data alone can be replicated very
accurately by a model based on completely different assumptions
and dynamics (Salinas et al., 2010).
4. A TRADE-OFF DRIVEN BY MOTIVATIONAL BIAS
The tachometric curve is highly sensitive to task manipulations
(Shankar et al., 2011; Hauser et al., 2013). Thus, many effects—for
instance, subtle changes in performance due to perceptual learn-
ing (Shankar et al., 2011)—are clearly seen that would normally
be impossible to resolve from the raw chronometric and psycho-
metric data. In this section and the next we exploit this to discern,
from the results of two experiments, the possible underlying
mechanisms whereby speed and accuracy may be traded.
The first experiment consisted of a variant of the compelled-
saccade task in which the monkey knew at the beginning of each
trial whether a large or a small reward was at stake (all details are
described by Shankar et al., 2011). The color of the target con-
veyed this information, and the association between color and
reward amount was kept constant for blocks of 150–250 trials. So,
during a block, correct movements to the red target would yield
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a higher reward than correct movements to the green target, but
the high- and low-reward colors were reversed in the next block.
Here, because the color of the fixation spot indicates the color
of the target, in each trial the subject knows how much reward
can be gained, but that is all: given that target color and tar-
get location vary randomly and independently across trials, this
knowledge provides no objective advantage, although it should
affect the subject’s motivation to perform the task correctly.
Comparison of responses in the high- and low-reward con-
ditions revealed what appeared to be a classic trade-off between
speed and accuracy.Whenworking for a large reward (high incen-
tive), on average the monkeys performed better (Figures 5A,F)
and responded more slowly (Figures 5B,G) than when a small
reward was at stake (low incentive). Both effects were relatively
moderate in absolute terms, but the gain of the trade-off was
high: an increase in performance of roughly 10% was accom-
panied by an increase in RT on the order of 10 ms—a change
in RT that is quite small as a fraction of its mean value (∼4%).
So, based on these data alone, it would seem that the increase in
performance incurred a very small cost in RT, and that the sys-
tem is such that a small flexibility in RT affords a large benefit in
success rate. Interpreted in terms of the two motor mechanisms
discussed earlier, this would mean that a tiny increase in thresh-
old (Figures 2A–D) or a tiny decrease in the mean build-up rates
(Figures 2E–H) would allow the sensory information to have a
considerably stronger influence on the outcome of each trial.
However, analysis of the data in terms of processing time paints
a much more nuanced picture in which both motor and percep-
tual mechanisms vary across conditions. In trials in which a high
reward was at stake, the tachometric curves of monkeys G and R
(Figures 5D,I) shifted to the left by about 30 and 20ms, respec-
tively, relative to when a low reward was at stake. This suggests
that the decision-making process itself starts sooner or advances
more rapidly when the incentive to perform accurately is high.
By fitting the empirical tachometric curves to continuous func-
tions (Figures 5D,I, thin black lines) and applying resampling
techniques to estimate the likely error in these fits (Figures 5E,J),
we found that the shifts were very highly significant (Shankar
et al., 2011). A leftward shift, however, does not necessarily imply
a higher percentage of correct responses, as illustrated earlier
(Figure 2J), and would likely be accompanied by lower RTs too
(Figure 2K), the opposite of the observed effect. So why the
discrepancy?
Intuitively, the answer is that at least two mechanisms must
be at work across conditions, given that the chronometric and
tachometric curves are highly independent. A faster onset of the
perceptual process could account for the leftward shift of the
tachometric curve, a slow-down in motor activity could account
FIGURE 5 | Psychophysical performance of twomonkeys in amotivational
bias experiment. At the beginning of each trial of the compelled-saccade task,
the monkey knewwhether a correct response would result in a small or a large
reward. The shown datawere sorted post hoc according to the reward that was
at stake in each trial, as indicated. (A–C) Summary statistics for monkey G.
When a high reward (purple) rather than a low reward (orange) was at stake, the
overall success rate (A) and mean RT (B) increased, and the tachometric curve
shifted to the left (C), indicating an earlier onset of the perceptual discrimination.
Error bars indicate ±1 SE. (D) Tachometric curves frommonkey G. Fitted
Weibull functions (black curves) are shown together with the experimental data
(colored traces). A vertical dotted line marks the center point of each curve
(indicated in C) derived from the fit, i.e., the time point at which the percent
correct is halfway between chance and the maximum value. (E) Joint
distributions of center points and rise times obtained from bootstrapping and
re-fitting of monkey G’s data, based on 2000 resamplings. The rise time is the
time that it would take for the curve to go from 50% to 100% correct if its slope
were always equal to the slope at the center point. Crosses mark the values of
the original fits shown in (D). Histograms at the top and on the right show the
corresponding marginal distributions. (F–J) As in (A–E) but for monkey R. See
Shankar et al. (2011) for details about experimental and statistical methods.
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for the increase in performance, and the net effect on RT could be
a combination of both.
The accelerated race-to-threshold model confirmed this intu-
ition quantitatively. The model reproduced all the observed
effects very accurately, and although this required modifying all
of its parameters to various degrees across the two conditions,
notably, these parameter differences were qualitatively the same
for three monkeys. As discussed earlier, some of the parameters
in the model relate fundamentally to perceptual processing and
the tachometric curve (e.g., visual latency; magnitude of accelera-
tion/deceleration), whereas others impact the initial motor plans
only (e.g., mean and variance of the initial build-up rates). To
tease apart their individual contributions to the observed exper-
imental results (Figure 5), we first ran the model that fitted the
low-reward condition and then compared the results to those of
additional runs in which only selected parameters were modified
as required to fit the high-reward condition.
The results were clear: although all parameters changed
across conditions and had some impact, the experimental data
could be largely explained by the two mechanisms illustrated in
Figures 2E–L acting simultaneously. Specifically, according to the
model, motor activity developed considerably more slowly dur-
ing high- than low-reward trials. This slow-down accounted for
virtually the full increase in the percentage of correct responses,
and in the case of monkey G, if acting alone it would have yielded
an increase in mean RT of ∼35ms. This tendency, however, was
largely offset by a smaller value of the visual latency parame-
ter that determines when the go signal and the color cue start
informing the motor circuit. This change explained most of the
shift of the tachometric curve and, by itself, would have pro-
duced a drop in mean RT of ∼30ms. So, motor and perceptual
mechanisms exerted independent effects on accuracy but oppos-
ing effects on speed. As a consequence, the net change in RT
produced by the model, with the contributions of all parameters
taken into consideration, was relatively small, ∼10ms, the same
as found experimentally.
This simple computational dissection indicates (1) that multi-
ple, distinct neural mechanisms are required to simultaneously
explain all the experimental findings in the motivation exper-
iment, and (2) that the coincident changes measured in
speed (RT) and accuracy (percent correct) do not reflect
a single, fundamental trade-off, but rather the combined
action of cognitive factors on separate motor and perceptual
processes.
Additional experimental observations supported these con-
clusions. For instance, note that the maximum percent correct
reached by the tachometric curves (Figures 5D,I) was not the
same in the two conditions. This means that, during trials in
which a large reward was on offer, the monkeys rarely made a
mistake when provided ample time to discriminate target from
distracter, whereas in trials in which the potential reward was
small, the monkeys made many more “careless” mistakes, errors
that could not be attributed to insufficient viewing time. The fre-
quency with which such errors occur is captured by one model
parameter, the lapse rate, and when target and distracter are
easily discriminable, as in the experiment, its effect is rather
unique—it cannot be reproduced or even approximated by other
combinations of parameters—which suggests that it involves yet
another mechanism that is distinct from those discussed above.
Therefore, to restate the main conclusion of this experiment,
motivation affects choice behavior by simultaneously altering
speed and accuracy, and there is good reason to believe that the
cognitive signals that mediate these effects are diverse and exert
at least partially independent control over motor and perceptual
processes (see Discussion). This suggests that, in general, one-
parameter descriptions of the speed-accuracy trade-off are likely
to be oversimplifications, and should be interpreted with great
caution.
5. A TRADE-OFF DRIVEN BY SPATIAL BIAS
Next, we consider a second experiment with asymmetric rewards
in the compelled-saccade task. It provides an interesting coun-
terpoint to that in the previous section because it shows that
the same motor and perceptual mechanisms may be engaged
quite differently across tasks, giving rise to stronger or weaker
trade-offs.
In this case, the monkeys received a large reward following
correct saccades to one side and a small reward following cor-
rect saccades to the other (all details are described by Stanford
et al., 2010). As a consequence, they developed a spatial bias,
a strong tendency to respond more often to one side than the
other. On average, the two animals that participated in this
experiment chose the high-reward side about 76% of the time
(but this number understates the strength of the preference; see
below). The high-reward side, left or right, was kept constant
during a block of 150–250 trials and was then switched. As
always, target colors and locations were randomly interleaved.
The collected data were then sorted according to the subject’s
choices; that is, trials were partitioned into two groups, those that
resulted in movements in the preferred (high-reward) direction,
and those that resulted in movements in the non-preferred (low-
reward) direction. These two data subsets were then analyzed
separately.
The behavior of the animals was strikingly different for the
two types of choice. Responses in the preferred direction were
much more prone to errors than those in the non-preferred
direction (Figures 6A,F), and were also initiated much sooner
(Figures 6B,G). In other words, the spatial bias induced a trade-
off between speed and accuracy across conditions whereby an
increase in performance of approximately 20% was accompanied
by an increase in RT of 25 or 48ms, depending on the subject.
This behavior can be intuitively understood as follows: the high-
reward side is chosen by default, so many choices toward that
side are incorrect; in contrast, the low-reward side is chosen only
if there is little uncertainty that the target is actually there, but
this happens only when the red and green spots are discriminated
accurately, i.e., when the rPT (and thus the RT) is long. This can
be seen quantitatively by plotting the fraction of choices made
to the low-reward side as a function of rPT (Figures 6E,J). The
resulting choice curve rises quite sharply, so the monkey’s pref-
erence is indeed dictated by the amount of cue viewing time.
This curve also shows that, in the absence of sensory evidence
(rPT 100ms), the monkey’s guess is to the high-reward side
between 80% and 90% of the time.
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FIGURE 6 | Psychophysical performance in a spatial bias experiment.
Correct choices to one side yielded a higher reward than correct choices to the
other side. Data are shown sorted according to the subject’s choices, either to
the preferred (high-reward, blue) or the non-preferred (low-reward, green) side,
as indicated. (A–C) Summary statistics for monkey S. When the preferred
rather than the non-preferred side was chosen, the overall success rate (A) and
mean RT (B) decreased substantially, and the tachometric curve shifted slightly
to the right (C). Error bars indicate±1 SE. (D) Tachometric curves frommonkey
S. Fitted Weibull functions (black curves) are shown together with the
experimental data (colored traces). Vertical dotted lines mark the center points
of the curves (indicated in C) derived from the fits. (E) Percentage of choices to
the non-preferred side as a function of rPT. As in (D), dotted lines mark the
center points of the tachometric curves. Gray shades indicate ±1 SE based on
binomial statistics. (F–J)As in (A–E) but for monkey G. (K–O)As in (A–E) but for
simulated responses. Model data were generated with the same parameters
as in Figure 4, except that the higher of the two initial build-up rates was
assigned to the preferred side in 90% of the trials (instead of the standard
50%). See Stanford et al. (2010) for experimental details.
In general, the effects on speed and accuracy
(Figures 6A,B,F,G) were considerably larger than in the
motivational bias experiment (Figures 5A,B,F,G). Interestingly,
however, although the main effect on the tachometric curve in
this case was again a leftward shift congruent with the condi-
tion with higher overall performance (Figures 6C,D,H,I), the
magnitude of the shift was smaller than in the motivational bias
experiment (Figures 5C,D,H,I). This suggests that the perceptual
process itself was affected less by the spatial bias than by the
motivational bias, and therefore, that the observed trade-off
in the former case may be accounted for almost entirely by an
internal adjustment in motor planning alone. Indeed, that is
precisely what a more thorough analysis of the data showed.
Again we used the accelerated race-to-threshold model to esti-
mate the contributions of different mechanisms to the biases
found empirically. However, instead of discussing the full model
fits to the psychophysical data, which involve numerous param-
eter differences across conditions, in this case we discuss a much
simplermanipulation that illustrates themain result more plainly.
It goes as follows. First we simulated N trials of the model with
a fixed set of parameters. This set was exactly the same one
used earlier to reproduce the behavior of monkey S (Figure 3F);
everything was balanced, unbiased. Then we divided the simu-
lated trials into two groups with approximately N/2 trials each:
one group included all the trials in which the motor plan to
the right had led initially, before the cue information was pre-
sented, and the other group included all other trials, in which the
plan to the left had drawn a higher initial build-up rate. For this,
trial outcome was irrelevant; only the initial build-up rates were
considered. Next, we designated the right side as the preferred,
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highly-rewarded side, and threw away 89% of the trials in the
second group, in which the non-preferred (left) plan had led ini-
tially. Finally, we merged the remaining simulated trials back into
a single data set, erased the information about which plan led ini-
tially, and analyzed them exactly as if they had been collected in
the experiment. With this method, we produced a biased data set
without changing the influence of the perceptual information or
the dynamics of the motor plans at all; all we did was create a
hypothetical subject, just like monkey S, that made 90% of its
initial guesses toward a preferred side (combining N/2 preferred
guesses with 0.11 × N/2 non-preferred guesses makes the former
90% of the total).
When the synthetic trials thus generated were sorted accord-
ing to choice, as was done with the monkey data, the results
qualitatively mimicked all the effects found experimentally:
choices in the preferred direction were less accurate (Figure 6K)
and faster (Figure 6L), the probability of making a non-
preferred choice varied sharply as a function of rPT (Figure 6O),
and the tachometric curves derived from preferred and non-
preferred choices were slightly shifted relative to each other
(Figures 6M,N). The underlying reason why such large differ-
ences emerged is that, by selecting trials based on the direc-
tion of the leading motor plan, the proportions of the five
basic types of motor competition (Figures 3A–E) became dras-
tically different for the two possible choices. Such proportions
alone have an enormous impact on the average RT and suc-
cess rate, even when the dynamics remain identical within
each type of race. So, all the relevant differences between
preferred and non-preferred choices—and in particular the
bulk of the speed-accuracy trade-off—can be explained by a
simple asymmetry in the way the motor plans are initially
deployed.
This is not to say that other properties of the motor plans
or of the perceptual process that informs them remained per-
fectly intact. In fact, there are hints that they did not. One is that
the maximum percent correct was significantly different for the
two tachometric curves of monkey G (Figure 6I), and another
is that the shifts seen in the real data were larger than that in
the simulation (Figures 6D,I,N). Additional adjustments to the
parameters of the model would be required to account for these
effects. However, these discrepancies are relatively small and do
not affect the main conclusion, which is that in the spatial bias
experiment the trade-off is larger than in the motivational bias
experiment and depends predominantly on the way the motor
plans for the two choices are deployed at the beginning of each
trial.
Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, these results also imply
that average RTsmay decrease in one condition relative to another
without any explicit slow-down of the motor circuitry. If this cir-
cuitry naturally produces a wide distribution of RTs, then the
apparent difference in response speed may result simply because
one condition samples more fast and fewer slow trials than
the other. In this sense, a change in response speed may not
necessarily reflect a change in dynamics.
Taken together, the results reviewed in this and the previ-
ous section indicate that the individual contributions of motor
and perceptual mechanisms to a given, experimentally observed
trade-off may vary widely depending on the particular circum-
stances of an experiment.
6. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Here we have reviewed behavioral, neurophysiological and mod-
eling results in an urgent decision-making task in which inde-
pendent, quantitative measures of motor and perceptual capacity
(chronometric and tachometric curves) can be obtained. Based
on this unique dissociation, we investigated how motor and per-
ceptual mechanisms interact to determine a subject’s response
speed (RT) and accuracy (percentage of correct choices). In other
words, we were able to decouple these quantities and investigate
the potential sources of their trade-off.
Based on a combination of behavioral and neurophysiologi-
cal constraints, the accelerated race-to-threshold model provides
a parsimonious description of how perceptual information may
resolve an ongoingmotor selection process during relatively rapid
choices. This heuristic model is key because it lets us evaluate the
functional roles that meaningful neural elements or features play
in the choice process. It shows, for instance, that the build-up
rates with which competing motor plans are deployed initially,
before perceptual information arrives, are absolutely critical in
determining the fate of any given task trial (Figure 4, see arrows
Salinas et al., 2010; Shankar et al., 2011). Likewise, the tachome-
tric curve demonstrates that the response latencies—neuronal,
not behavioral—to the go signal and the cue are much more
flexible than one might have expected (Figures 5D,I), and the
model serves to evaluate quantitatively the consequences of this
(Figures 2I–L; see also Salinas and Stanford, 2013). Of course,
other neural parametersmay be important too; the point is simply
that many specific properties of perceptual and motor-planning
circuits may be quantitatively related to simultaneous changes in
speed and accuracy.
When seen under the light of this framework, the experimental
results obtained in the two biased versions of the compelled-
saccade task lead to three conclusions: (1) that both motor and
perceptual mechanisms may contribute to an observed trade-off,
(2) that each of these mechanisms may weigh in more or less
heavily, depending on the particulars of the task, and (3) that, as
a consequence, small or large trade-offs may result from various
combinations of motor and perceptual contributions.
This would also explain why, under certain circumstances, it
is possible to observe a decrease in RT and/or an increase in
accuracy with no apparent trade-off (Bendiksby and Platt, 2006;
Takikawa et al., 2002). Other studies are also consistent with an
intricate, fluid link between perception and action (Battaglia and
Schrater, 2007; Cardoso-Leite and Gorea, 2010; Simoncini et al.,
2012; see below).
6.1. LIFE WITHOUT THE TACHOMETRIC CURVE
It is interesting to ponder how the two bias experiments
would be interpreted without the tachometric curve. In the
case of the motivational bias, the trade-off would seem small
(Figures 5A,B,F,G), and there would be no reason to think that
the perceptual evaluation itself would or should change from
one condition to another. The results could be explained as a
small increase in a response criterion leading to slightly better
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performance and slighlty higher RTs. Instead, the tachomet-
ric curve reveals significant changes in perceptual performance
(Figures 5D,I), and it is only because of the model that those
changes can be reconciled with the relatively small observed
trade-off, and that a rather substantial adjustment in motor
planning can be inferred.
In the spatial bias experiment the speed-accuracy trade-off
is large and evident (Figures 6A,B,F,G), but without the tacho-
metric curve it again would be virtually impossible to ascertain
whether or not changes in perception are involved—such changes
are there (Figures 6D,I), but are noticeably smaller and less
important in proportion to the magnitude of the trade-off in this
case. Furthermore, the choice curve (Figures 6E,J) and the model
(Figures 6K–O) provide a clear and parsimonious account of the
results: the subjects’ strategy is to almost always make an initial
guess toward the preferred side, and override that initial plan only
when the perceptual evidence against it arrives early enough and
is strong enough. Without this insight, which depends critically
on the distinction between RT and rPT, it would be very diffi-
cult to understand why, at a given gap, the subjects choose the
low-reward side on some trials but not on others.
Interestingly, if the goal of the internal circuitry is to imple-
ment said strategy, then the observed trade-off may be a plain
byproduct of the implementation, because the results can be
largely accounted for simply by appropriately redistributing sim-
ulated trials across conditions, without altering any parameters or
interactions in the model. In other words, the internal circuitry
may not be directly attempting to find an optimal compromise
in the exchange of RT for percent correct; rather, the observed
exchange may be an inevitable consequence of a different trade-
off, that between the possibility of a large reward versus the
certainty of a small one.
6.2. UBIQUITY OF FAST DECISIONS
A few other tasks used in past studies compel participants to make
a response before the correct answer is fully specified (Schouten
and Bekker, 1967; Becker and Jürgens, 1979; Ghez et al., 1989;
Hening et al., 1998; Chapman et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2011). In
particular, the countermanding or stop-signal task is very similar
to our compelled-saccade task, except for two main differences: it
is a go/no-go task, and the relevant sensory evaluation is a detec-
tion rather than a discrimination—but notably, a tachometric
curve can be constructed in this case too (Salinas and Stanford,
2013). Numerous experimental manipulations of the counter-
manding task have led to simultaneous changes in RT and percent
correct (Cabel et al., 2000; Cavina-Pratesi et al., 2001; Ramautar
et al., 2004; Emeric et al., 2007; Stevenson et al., 2009; Leotti
and Wager, 2010), and modeling work indicates that, in differ-
ent experiments, the observed trade-off may result either from
adjustments in motor planning alone, in the perceptual detec-
tion process alone, or in both (Salinas and Stanford, 2013). The
parallels with the experiments reviewed here are striking. For
instance, variations in response latency associated with the detec-
tion of the saccadic target and the stop signal seem to be major
determinants of perceptual performance. Overall, the spectrum of
potential speed-accuracy trade-offs in the countermanding task
is just as wide as illustrated here, if not wider, in terms of their
magnitude and variety of underlying neural mechanisms (Salinas
and Stanford, 2013).
These results notwithstanding, how general are the conclu-
sions presented here? Perhaps compelled-response tasks put sub-
jects in an unnatural setting in which themechanisms that control
speed and accuracy are engaged in rather anomalous ways. To the
contrary, we think that compelled tasks are goodmodels for many
real-life situations in which choices are made quickly (see Uchida
et al., 2006).
For instance, eye movements (2–3/s) show similar distribu-
tions of fixation times and intersaccadic intervals under a wide
variety of viewing conditions (Berg et al., 2009; Castelhano et al.,
2009), which suggests that they are normally programmed con-
tinuously, without waiting for particular perceptual events to
happen (McPeek et al., 2000; Hafed and Ignashchenkova, 2013).
Furthermore, the ability to quicklymodify ongoingmotor plans is
essential in situations that demand extreme performance, such as
high-speed chases (Ghose et al., 2006, 2009). Competitive sports
provide many familiar examples too. To return a tennis serve,
hit a curveball, or stop a penalty, movements must be prepared
early and the corresponding motor plans must take into account
relevant perceptual information as soon as it becomes available
(Abernethy, 1990; Land and McLeod, 2000; Yarrow et al., 2009).
Interestingly, athletic skill may be thought of as an unusually weak
speed-accuracy trade-off, in that a professional squash player can
strike the ball both faster and more accurately than a beginner,
and there is evidence that when the skill level achieved is excep-
tional, it is so in both perceptual and motor domains (Yarrow
et al., 2009).
In this respect, note that the “urgency” of the compelled-
saccade task refers to the perceptual analysis process rather
than to motor execution. The saccadic RTs obtained in the task
(Figure 1C) are well within the normal range for choice behav-
iors (e.g., DiCarlo and Maunsell, 2005; Berg et al., 2009); it is the
color discrimination that is time-limited. For a participant, the
decision is urgent in the same way as for a batter trying to hit
a baseball: there is ample time to perform a required movement
(a saccade or a swing), but very little time to make the relevant
judgment (red/green or curveball/fastball) and inform the ongo-
ing motor plan so that the movement is correct. In contrast, by
specifically requiring that subjects remain still while the critical
sensory information is displayed, the majority of laboratory tasks
used to study perceptual decision making abolish this temporal
conflict, both in fixed-duration and RT paradigms. This, however,
makes it extremely difficult to determine when the perceptual dis-
crimination finishes and when the motor plans start (e.g., Kiani
et al., 2008; Port and Wurtz, 2009; Zariwala et al., 2013)—and
thus to attribute a given change in mean RT to either of these
events.
6.3. URGENT VERSUS NON-URGENT DECISIONS
The distinction between urgent and non-urgent tasks parallels a
broad conceptual division in the ways in which sensory, cognitive
and motor circuits may interact to carry out goal-directed actions
or choices. In one scenario, they operate in a strictly serial fash-
ion whereby perceptual analysis needs to reach a conclusion first,
before the motor selection process can begin. In the alternative
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scenario, the simultaneous activation of multiple uninformed
motor plans marks the start of the choice process, and the com-
petition is subsequently guided by perceptual information on the
fly, if and whenever it becomes available. Each of these possi-
bilities is likely to apply under certain circumstances. Cisek and
Kalaska (2010), Cisek (2012) and Padoa-Schioppa (2011) discuss
this issue at length. Here, we make two observations about this
distinction in regard to our results.
First, we note that the former, serial account is incompati-
ble with the compelled-saccade task (Salinas et al., 2010), but
beyond that, one could argue that, for time scales below roughly
1000ms, the idea of sequentially ordered perceptual and motor
stages is inconsistent even with results from ostensibly serial deci-
sion tasks. This can be appreciated in two limit cases in which
the trade-off between speed and accuracy essentially disappears.
At one extreme, performance in many tasks does not benefit
from prolonged deliberation times beyond 250–300ms (Uchida
et al., 2006), so that the optimal behavior is to respond rapidly
(within <300ms) regardless of difficulty. This is precisely what
Mainen and colleagues found in an odor categorization task in
rats (Zariwala et al., 2013). At the other extreme, note that the
rise in choice-related firing activity is often interpreted as a pure
accumulation of sensory evidence (Gold and Shadlen, 2001), but
the notion that sensory evidence must achieve a critical thresh-
old before the effector system is engaged is difficult to reconcile
with choices made on the basis of little or no sensory evidence.
Consider, for instance, the zero-coherence trials in the random-
dot motion discrimination task (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001);
what drives choice commitment when the sensory input to be
integrated consists exclusively of noise? A choice under such con-
dition is typically framed and modeled as the result of a lower
threshold or collapsed decision bound wherein the evidence cri-
terion is relaxed so that less (or no) sensory evidence is required
to engage the motor circuitry (Ditterich, 2006; Beck et al., 2008;
Hanks et al., 2011). But this is essentially a matter of interpreta-
tion: a collapsing decision bound is functionally equivalent to an
increasing motor plan or urgency signal (Cisek et al., 2009; Thura
et al., 2012). So, viewed from a different perspective, the “percep-
tual threshold” can be interpreted as the point in time at which
a commitment to a motor choice curtails the evidence accumu-
lation phase that had been informing the emerging motor plan
to that point. Importantly, current neurophysiological evidence
(Hanes and Schall, 1996; Heitz and Schall, 2012; see also Hayden
et al., 2011) indicates that there is indeed such thing as thresh-
old crossing, at least for saccadic choices, but it is a decidedly
motor event. Furthermore, as the choice-related activity rises, its
level relative to threshold is directly related to the degree of motor
commitment (Gold and Shadlen, 2000).
Second, several studies within the latter camp, which considers
the scheduling of motor actions to be independent of perceptual
events, resonate particularly well with our approach. In particular,
Goodale and colleagues studied the hand trajectories that result
when humans perform a compelled-reaching task (Chapman
et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2011). Participants were obliged to begin
execution of a pointing movement toward one of various stim-
uli, but information identifying the true target was released only
after the onset of the reach. The characteristic spatial patterns that
resulted indicated that, initially, multiple reaching plans toward
various potential targets develop in parallel, with the initial move-
ment direction reflecting an underlying vector-averaging opera-
tion; the final movement direction is disambiguated later, when
the true target is revealed. Interestingly, they also found that stim-
uli of greater salience (through greater contrast or pixel density)
confers greater initial weight to their corresponding motor plans,
even when such saliency is unlikely to signal the true target loca-
tion (Wood et al., 2011; see also Schütz et al., 2012). Notably,
this pop-out effect went away when participants were allowed
to briefly view the stimulus cue before initiating the reach. This
means that motor plans associated with salient stimuli are acti-
vated more strongly, but unless the observer has reason to believe
that a stimulus is important beyond its perceptual salience, this
increased weight dwindles rapidly. So, perceptual information
continuously modulates ongoing motor plans, likely via multiple
pathways (e.g., bottom-up versus top-down).
In agreement with the aforementioned findings in FEF
(Stanford et al., 2010; Costello et al., 2013), this conclusion is
highly consistent with analyses of single-neuron activity recorded
in the parietal reach region of monkeys, which show (1) that com-
peting motor plans are initially activated when multiple reach
targets are presented and a choice needs to be made (Scherberger
and Andersen, 2007), and (2) that the motor conflict is resolved
either spontaneously or once the relevant cue information is pro-
vided (Klaes et al., 2011). Similar ideas have also been advocated
by Cisek and colleagues based on recordings from premotor areas
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2005; Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011), giv-
ing rise to a powerful modeling framework, the “urgency-gating
model” (Cisek, 2006; Cisek et al., 2009; Thura et al., 2012), that
is similar in spirit to our accelerated race-to-threshold model (see
Costello et al., 2013).
These findings demonstrate that, during rapid choices, percep-
tual andmotor planning processes overlap extensively in time and
are likely to contribute jointly to RT and accuracy under many
circumstances. Their interaction is evident even in the absence
of motor competition, when the upcoming movement is certain
(Buonocore and McIntosh, 2008, 2012; Welchman et al., 2010;
Bompas and Sumner, 2011). As a consequence, pinpointing the
mechanisms that give rise to an observed trade-off is likely to be
exceedingly difficult in general—unless additional experimental
constraints independent of RT and percent correct are available.
6.4. BACK TO THE FUTURE: A HISTORICAL NOTE
The existence of a speed-accuracy trade-off has been acknowl-
edged for many years (Woodworth, 1899; Hick, 1952), and it once
was considered to have “great potential to advance all areas of
cognitive psychology” (Wickelgren, 1977).
In 1977, Wickelgren passionately argued that generating
speed-accuracy functions—the curves obtained by plotting the
percentage of correct responses versus RT—would be vastly supe-
rior to simply evaluating RT and performance in single, indepen-
dent experiments. He reasoned that a prototypical speed-accuracy
curve would have three essential components: (1) an initial delay
period during which performance would be at chance, (2) a ceil-
ing value reached at long RTs beyond which performance could
not increase further, and (3) a steep rise in performance around
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FIGURE 7 | Speed-accuracy curves in the compelled-saccade task.
(A) Percentage of correct responses as a function of RT for monkeys S (left)
and G (right), computed from the same experimental data shown in
Figure 1. Trials were sorted according to RT, regardless of gap, using bins
with a 40ms width sliding in steps of 2ms. Gray shades indicate ±1 SE
based on binomial statistics. (B) RT distributions for correct (blue) and
incorrect (magenta) choices for each monkey, based on the same bins
used in (A).
a short window of RTs. All three features would be informa-
tive and potentially interpretable in terms of separate cognitive
mechanisms. Wickelgren (1977) further distinguished two ways
to create such a curve, both potentially useful. One version used
the “macro-trade-off,” which is what commonly results when
experimental manipulations are introduced (i.e., via deadlines,
asymmetric payoffs, instructions emphasizing speed or accuracy,
etc.); the other version used the “micro-trade-off,” which is seen
by the post hoc partitioning of RTs from a single experiment into
small bands for analysis. Building on the work of Pachella (1974),
Wickelgren suggested that internal variations in response criteria
due to arousal, attention, and other covert factors creates variabil-
ity within the RT distribution that macro-plots might not account
for, but that would manifest in the micro-curves.
These ideas faded somewhat (but see, e.g., Giordano et al.,
2009), most likely, we suspect, because the shapes of the speed-
accuracy curves obtained experimentally were not stereotypical,
as was hoped initially, nor consistent across experiments. For
example, when the curves are generated from the data in the stan-
dard compelled-saccade task (Figure 7A), the resulting shapes
are essentially meaningless. The framework presented here makes
it easy, in retrospect, to see the reason for such failure: RT is
not the same thing as processing time, and it is the relationship
between performance and processing time that is stereotypical.
That relationship—which is none other than the tachometric
curve—describes precisely how much accuracy is gained for a
given amount of time. It does this within a given experiment,
as the micro-curve was supposed to do, and also decouples any
true changes in perception from purely motor variations in RT,
as may occur during a macro-trade-off. For the speed-accuracy
curve to work as envisioned, the RT would need to correlate very
tightly with rPT, but in general it does not, because it additionally
depends on many cognitive processes such as attention, memory,
or motor planning, that contribute to its variance (Figure 7B).
Wickelgren (1977) recognized the enormous utility of a curve
that would accurately reveal the dependence of performance on
time. It could serve as a powerful tool for studying the dynam-
ics of information processing across subjects, modalities, and task
conditions, and by extension, for studying the neural mechanisms
underlying fundamental cognitive functions. We submit that it is
the tachometric curve, not the speed-accuracy curve, that fulfills
this promise.
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